Does James have a Place for Objectivity? by Levine, Steven
 
European Journal of Pragmatism and
American Philosophy 
V-2 | 2013
Pragmatism and the Social Dimension of Doubt
Does James have a Place for Objectivity?










Steven Levine, « Does James have a Place for Objectivity? », European Journal of Pragmatism and
American Philosophy [Online], V-2 | 2013, Online since 24 December 2013, connection on 22 April 2019.
URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/551  ; DOI : 10.4000/ejpap.551 
This text was automatically generated on 22 April 2019.
Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right
of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Does James have a Place for
Objectivity?
A Response to Misak
Steven Levine
1 In her new book The American Pragmatists Cheryl Misak provides a reading of the history
of American Pragmatism in which it is composed of two related yet distinct types of
pragmatism. She characterizes the debate between these two types of pragmatism as a
debate between
those who assert (or whose view entails) that there is no truth and objectivity to be
had anywhere and those who take pragmatism to promise an account of truth that
preserves our cognitive aspiration of getting things right. On the one side of the
debate we have Richard Rorty and his classical  predecessors (James and Dewey)
holding that there is no truth at which we might aim – only agreement within a
community or what works for an individual or what is found to solve a problem. On
the other side of the divide, we have those who think of pragmatism as rejecting an
ahistorical, transcendental, or metaphysical theory of truth, but nonetheless being
committed to doing justice to the objective dimension of human inquiry – to the
fact  that  those engaged in deliberation and investigation take themselves  to  be
aiming at getting things right, avoiding mistakes, and improving their beliefs and
theories. On this more objective kind of pragmatism, which emanates from Wright
and Peirce, the fact that our inquiries are historically situated does not entail that
they lack objectivity. (Misak, 2013: 3)
2 Others have offered this “two pragmatism” reading, but no one has articulated it as well
or with such historical thoroughness. In making vivid this contrast, and letting us see
what is at stake in it, Misak’s book performs an important service for those interested in
the past and future of pragmatism.
3 Misak’s account is not neutral. Instead she intervenes into the debate and argues that the
Peirceian line of pragmatism, which she claims includes C. I. Lewis and Wilfrid Sellars,
represents the best that pragmatism has to offer. But in her zeal to distinguish this line of
pragmatism  from  the  Jamesian  line,  the  one  that  supposedly  culminates  in  Rorty’s
dismissal  of  objectivity,  Misak overstates her case.  The notion that James and Dewey
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thought that there is, in Misak’s words, “no truth and objectivity to be had anywhere” is
in my view palpably false and accepts pragmatism’s bad press rather than corrects it. In
this response I try to provide this correction by showing that James – who for reasons of
space is the only figure I can discuss – has a place for objectivity in his thought. The point
of doing this is to cast doubt on the cogency of the “two pragmatism” reading of the
pragmatic tradition.
4 Before I get to James, however, let me first signal some important areas of agreement.
First, I agree with Misak that the “eclipse narrative” about pragmatism is a misleading
interpretive device; that pragmatism was not simply killed off by analytical philosophy
but was absorbed by it in complex ways. Her detailed telling of this alternative account of
the history of pragmatism is fascinating and enlightening. Second, I agree with Misak that
James and Dewey (and of course Rorty) do not do justice to the fact that truth is a distinct
norm of thought and inquiry that cannot be reduced to either warrantedness or to what
works (in the way of thought). Although I do not think that Misak does justice to the
complexity of James’ theory of truth one can agree that James was not careful enough in
articulating his theory, sometimes leaving the reader with a sense that he thinks that
truth is what works or is satisfying for me or for you. Misak’s attempt to distance what is
best in pragmatism from this incorrect view of truth is justified.
5 My disagreement with Misak does not so much concern truth, but objectivity. Truth and
objectivity are of course related. In thinking about how one’s thought and experience can
be answerable to a world that is distinct from it we are thinking about how we can get
that world right by having true beliefs. But the issue of objectivity is not quite the same as
that of truth. Here is how Misak frames the issue of objectivity as it bears on the debate
between the two pragmatisms:
One kind of pragmatism thinks that our history and evolution makes us into the
interpretive  engines  we  are  and,  although  we  cannot  completely  pry  apart
interpretation from the truth of the matter, there nonetheless is a matter that we
are interpreting. That is  Peirce,  and we shall  see,  C.  I.  Lewis.  The other kind of
pragmatism thinks that not even by abstraction can we say that there is something
that stands apart from our interpretation of it. That is Dewey and, in a different
sort of way, James and Schiller. (Misak, 2013: 116)
6 Here  Misak  connects  the  objectivity  issue  to  the  threat  of  Idealism:  can  one’s
philosophical account of experience and thought avoid an Idealism that thinks that the
nature and existence of the world is dependent on our interpretations of it? Can one
make sense of the fact that our experience and thought is constrained by and answerable 
to a world that stands apart from our take on this world? For all pragmatists any answer
to this question must avoid the Myth of the Given, the myth that, in Misak’s words, we
can completely pry apart our interpretations from the interpreted matter and get at the
matter itself directly. Here, without conceptual mediation, the nature of reality, i.e., its
intrinsic  categorical  structure,  would  be  Given  simply  though  our  mirroring  or
representing it.1 Instead, the pragmatist thinks that our very ability to have experiences
and thoughts about the world presupposes that certain acquired conditions, i.e., a sign
system or conceptual scheme, habitual associations, etc. already be in place to inform our
interpretations of the matter at hand. In light of this Misak’s claim becomes this: Peirce
and C. I. Lewis (and Sellars) can, without falling prey to the Myth of the Given, account for
the fact that our experience and thought is answerable to something independent of it,
while James, Dewey, (and of course Rorty), cannot.
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7 How can I resist this claim? Misak’s specific brief against James focuses on two things: 1)
his subjectivism about truth, i.e., his view that truth is what is expedient for me or for you
as opposed to what is expedient for a community over time, and 2) James’ attempt, in
“The Will to Believe,” to expand the pool of evidence that a subject can bring to bear for
the truth of a belief. I have already admitted that James’ “vulgar” account of truth, to the
extent  that  it  is  his  theory,  is  not  acceptable;  and others  have already convincingly
challenged Misak’s reading of “The Will to Believe.”2 Instead of focusing on these two
issues I  am going to discuss another aspect of  James’  thought that Misak completely
ignores, his teleological account of the mind. I do so because it is here that one gets
James’ account of objectivity into view. By ignoring this aspect of his work, Misak gives a
very one-sided account of James, one that reverberates through her whole history of
pragmatism.
8 For  example,  it  is  only  by ignoring the teleological  account  of  mind that  Misak can
plausibly claim that Peirce was a larger influence on C. I. Lewis than James. While Lewis is 
correctly placed by Misak in the Peircian line of pragmatism insofar as he has a notion of
objective constraint, one gets no sense from her account that the basic thought at the
center of his Conceptualistic Pragmatism – namely, that a subject’s “thick experience” of
the world of objects in space and time is the result of an interpretation of the Given by a
conceptual scheme that is pragmatically a priori, a scheme whose adoption is determined
by the practical interest of the subject – is an application of James’ teleological theory of
mind.3 Similarly, Misak’s account of Putnam is disfigured by the need to keep the two
pragmatisms apart. Putnam takes it that his internal realism, the idea that common sense
realism  is  consistent  with  conceptual  relativity,  has  its  origin  in  James’  epistemic
pluralism.4 But  Putnam  uses  this  “pragmatic  realism”  to  argue  against  Rorty,  who
according to Misak culminates the Jamesian line of pragmatism. Clearly, the story about
the two lines of pragmatism is not nearly so neat as Misak makes it.
9 So what is James’ teleological account of the mind? In all periods of his work, James gives
us a very basic account of the cognitive situation in which both human and non-human
creatures find themselves. Creatures who are alive “inhabit environments which act on
them and on which they  in  turn react”  (James,  1981:  19).  The  environment  acts  on
creatures by stimulating their sense organs. But according to James there is far more
information in the environment than creatures can utilize to prepare their behavioral
responses. Creatures are immersed in a chaotic stream of sensory data, what James calls a
“much-at-onceness.” To cope successfully with the environment creatures must organize
the  much-at-onceness  through various  forms of  selection.  At  the  most  basic  level,  a
creature’s sense organs are selective mechanisms that, for physiological reasons, reliably
respond to some sensory groupings and not others. The experiencing subject has no say
here. Then, through attention, creatures further order the sensory flux that makes it past
this  initial  sorting.  Which  features  of  the  sensory  flux  a  creature  attends  to  and
discriminates, and which features they ignore, is determined by the creature’s interests. In
creatures of higher complexity this ordering of the much-at-onceness is undertaken not
just by acts of attention but by conceptions,  “teleological instruments” that help us, in
light of our interests, to practically handle the perceptual flux. 5 “Each act of conception
results from our attention singling out some one part of the mass of matter-for-thought
which the world presents, and holding fast to it, without confusion” (James, 1981: 437).
Concepts are powerful instruments to further our basic practical and aesthetic interests
because in holding fast to a pattern of attention over time they greatly expand our ability
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to  foresee  environmental tendencies  and  prepare  for  them,  and  to  discern  unity  in
complexity. Concepts, “by picking out from it [the much-at-onceness] the items which
concern us, and connecting them with others far away, which we say ‘belong’ with them,
we are able to make out definite threads of sequence and tendency; to foresee particular
liabilities and get ready for them; and to enjoy simplicity and harmony instead of what
was chaos” (James, 1979: 95).
10 Because of the ubiquity and importance of selection in mental life generally we can now
see how mistaken it is to think of “‘experience’ as being equivalent to the mere presence
of a certain outward order. Millions of items of the outward order are present to my
senses  which never  properly  enter  into  my experience.  Why? Because  they have  no
interest for me. My experience is what I agree to attend to. Only those items which I
notice shape my mind – without selective interest, experience is an utter chaos” (James
1983: 119).6 In light of this we can see how James avoids the Given: while the flux of
sensory data is given in the innocent sense that creatures have no control over whether
they are exposed to it, this flux is not Given because what one experiences depends not on
the intrinsic nature of the flux being impressed on our minds but on the way the flux is
interpretively taken in light of one’s interests, ideals, and ends. As James famously put it:
I, for my part, cannot escape the consideration, forced on me at very turn, that the
knower is not simply a mirror floating with no foot-hold anywhere, and passively
reflecting an order that he comes up and finds simply existing. The knower is an
actor, and co-efficient of the truth on one side, while on the other he registers the
truth which he helps to create. In other words, there belongs to mind, from its birth
upward,  a  spontaneity,  a  vote.  It  is  in  the game,  not  a  mere looker-on;  and its
judgments of the should-be,  its ideals, cannot be peeled off from the body of the
cogitandum as if they were excrescences, or meant, at most, survival (James, 1978:
21).
11 But does this not just show that Misak’s diagnosis of James is right? It is one thing to say
that  knowers  are  a  co-efficient  of  truth  in  the  sense  that  truth  cannot  completely
transcend human experience and practices of inquiry, another to say that the inquirer
who registers the truth helps to create it. How can there be constraint by something that
stands apart from our knowing and inquiring when the knower partially creates the truth
– or better, the reality – that they come to know? So while James avoids the Given, he
does so in so extravagant a fashion that he is lead into accepting an Idealism which
cannot  make  sense  of  our  answerability  to  something  independent  of  thought,
interpretation, and experience.
12 To avoid this outcome James must say that while knowers partially create the reality that
they come to know, they are nonetheless constrained by this reality in coming to know it.
But can this be said intelligibly?
13 Consider James’ often used metaphor of a sculptor and a marble block. “The mind… works
on the data it receives very much as a sculptor works on his block of stone” (James, 1981:
277). The sculptor does not create the marble block, nor can he do whatever he wants
with it. The marble imposes limits on the sculptor. It is amenable to being cut up in some
ways, but not others. Similarly, subjects do not create the sensory much-at-onceness, and
it limits what subjects can think and do. “Sensations are forced upon us, coming we know
not whence” (James, 1975: 117), and it provides “the mere matter to the thought of all of
us indifferently” (James, 1981: 277). But while marble imposes limitations on the sculptor,
there is no pre-determined way that the sculptor must cut the block of marble. There is a
freedom of maneuver here. Similarly with “our sensations, That they are is undoubtedly
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beyond our control; but which we attend to, note and make emphatic in our conclusions
depends on our own interests” (James, 1975: 118).7 So while sensations are “forced on us,”
“beyond our control,” and provide the “matter to the thought of all of us indifferently,”
there  is  free  play  concerning  how  they  are  attended  to,  discriminated,  and
conceptualized.
14 There are two points to note here. When James says that “we attend to our sensations” he
does not mean that we attend to our sensations as sensations – i.e., as “inner states.” We
don’t attend to our sensations as sensations because, due to our habitual interests and
modes of cognitive activity, what is given to a subject is a world of colored and shaped
physical  objects  in  space  and  time. In  essence,  naïve  perception  is  intentional,  and
sensations are cognitive states that disclose basic features of the objective world, i.e., its
voluminousness and qualitative character.8 Our being aware of sensations as inner states
depends on our abstracting them out of our thick experience of spatio-temporal objects
and, through an act of reflection, transposing them “into” the mind. An awareness of
sensations as sensations therefore does not come first but last. As James puts it: “So far is
it from being true that our first way of feeling things is the feeling of them as subjective
or mental, that the exact opposite seems to be true. Our earliest, most instinctive, least
developed kind of consciousness is the objective kind; and only as reflection becomes
developed do we become aware of an inner world at all” (James, 1981: 679). If we stay true
to lived experience, what is given to conscious subjects are not sensations but reality with
all of its manifold properties.
15 Second, James does not think that there is a single way that the sensory flux must be
taken up in our acts of attention and conceptualization, and so does not think that there
is a single “reality.” Reality is the product not only of a subject’s ordering of the sensory
flux by acts of attention and conceptualization, but also of past acts of attention and
conceptualization, ones made by the subject and by their culture. These past acts become
habituated, leading to typical ways of interpreting and apperceiving the sensory flux.
These typical  ways generate distinct “worlds.” James mentions the world of common
sense,  the  world  of  science,  the  ideal  world  of  logic  and mathematics,  fictional  and
imaginary worlds, amongst others. None of these worlds are Given, even the common
sense world of physical objects in space and time. For its basic conceptions
may have been successfully  discovered  by prehistoric  geniuses  whose  names the
night of antiquity has covered up; they may have been verified by the immediate
facts of experience which they first fitted; and then from fact to fact and from man
to man they may have spread, until all language rested on them and we are now
incapable of thinking naturally in any other terms. (James 1975: 89)9
16 In other words, even the nature of the common sense world is not Given but partially
“created” by knowers because this reality can only be discerned by subjects in light of
their possession of habits of attention and use of conceptions (of thing, kind, subjects and
attributes, causal influence, space and time, etc.) that were discovered in the past, found
to “work,” and passed on by language and culture.
17 James  offers  this  admittedly  speculative  thesis  because  he  was  impressed  by  a
philosophical lesson that he took from the advance of nineteenth century science. James
noted  that  emerging  micro-physical  sciences  use  different  basic  conceptions  and
categories than “common sense,” which itself uses different categories than those used
by certain philosophical redescriptions of the real, for example Hume’s skeptical account
or Kant’s critical account of reality. All of these schemes “work” in the sense that they
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successfully order the sensory flux in light of different ends.10 But if this is so, James
thinks, we have little reason to think that the conceptions of common sense mirror or
duplicate reality in itself any more than the conceptions of these other schemes. James
draws a radical conclusion from this:
There is no ringing conclusion possible when we compare these types of thinking,
with a view to telling which is the more absolutely true. Their naturalness, their
intellectual economy, their fruitfulness for practice,  all  start up distinct tests of
their veracity… Common sense is better for one sphere of life, science for another,
philosophical criticism for a third; but whether either be truer absolutely, Heaven
only knows. (James, 1975: 93)
18 But while we can draw no ringing conclusion concerning which scheme discloses the
nature of the absolutely true or the real, we should not conclude from this that reality is
“subjective.”  What  the  success  of  these  different  categorical  schemes relative  to  our
various  purposes  indicates  is  not  subjectivism  but  conceptual  pluralism:  there  are
multiple realities or worlds because the sensory flux tolerates multiple ways of being taken
up. We know this not on a priori grounds but on experiential grounds, namely, the fact that
the different schemes are used and work. Based on the empirical evidence we ought not, as
Rationalists do, suppose that there is a single way reality is, one that is gotten right by a
single vocabulary.11 But not supposing this does not entail that there is no way that reality
is, or that the sensory flux can be taken in any way. As James says:
[T]here is something in every experience that escapes our arbitrary control. If it be
a sensible experience it coerces our attention; if a sequence, we cannot invert it; if
we compare two terms we come to only one result. There is a push, an urgency,
without our very experience, against which we are on the whole powerless, and
which drives us in a direction that is the destiny of our belief. (James, 1975a: 45)
19 The sensory flux, once attended to and apperceived as a reality, dictates to our experience.
Using an example from the world of sense, someone counting a constellation of seven
stars, James says:
A fact virtually pre-exists when every condition of its realization save one is already
there. In this case the condition lacking is the act of the counting and comparing
mind. But the stars (once the mind considers them) themselves dictate the result.
The counting in no wise modifies their previous nature, and, they being what and
where  they  are,  cannot  fall  differently…  Undeniably  something  comes  by  the
counting that was not there before. And yet, that something was always true. In one
sense you create it, and in another sense you find it. (James, 1975a: 56)12
20 Here we can see how James’ view makes a place for objectivity. While you “can’t weed out
the human contribution” (James,  1975:  122) in isolating “the real,” for facts are only
disclosed to creatures like us in light of the selective activity of the mind – an activity that
itself “builds out” and is in that sense partially creative of reality – the facts which are
disclosed through this activity are already there to be found and “agreed with.” Any
discussion of  James’  theory of  truth must  start  here,  with this account of  objectivity
already in place. While one might find that his theory of truth is not satisfactory, one will
see it in its proper context, a context in which subjects, in light of their interests, discover
or find out how the world already is.
21 There is  a  final  question that  needs consideration:  how do we know  that  there is  an
indifferent sensory matter that the various realities or worlds fit? If one’s answer is that
we know this through a direct introspective awareness then one would endorse the Myth
of the Given, the myth, in this case, that one can ‘pry apart’ one’s interpretation of the
sensory matter and get directly to the matter itself.
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22 James has two different accounts of our awareness of the sensory flux. According to the
first we can “speculatively image a state of ‘pure’ experience” (James, 1975a: 43) but we
cannot experience it. We cannot experience the sensory flux “pure” because, as we saw
above,  the  sensory  matter  has  already  been  ordered  by  past  acts  of  attention,
discrimination, and conceptualization. The sensory flux is not “seen” but posited through
a type of “abstraction” to make sense of 1) the experiential difference between our being
sensuously  acquainted  with  something  and  our  merely  thinking  about  it,  and  more
importantly for us,  2) the fact that experience is resisted.13 On this view, there is no
position outside of experience that allows us, in advance as it were, to isolate the resisting
sensuous matter given in our experience; rather we find, within experience, that certain
of our activities are resisted while others are not. In essence we can only know which
interpretive takings  of  the sensory matter  work and which don’t  by trying,  through
experiments in  our  thought  and  action .  On this  account,  it  is  the  resistance  that  we
experience in these experiments that licenses us to posit a resisting sensory matter in
experience, not our direct acquaintance with the sensory matter.
23 The second account,  in contrast,  claims that  we can  be  directly  acquainted with the
sensory flux. While the sensory flux is not graspable it can, in certain circumstances, be
glimpsed.
Reality independent of human thinking… seems a very hard thing to find. It reduces
to  what  is  just  entering  into  experience  and yet  to  be  named,  or  else  to  some
imagined aboriginal presence in experience, before any belief about the presence
has arisen, before any human conception has been applied. It is what is absolutely
dumb and evanescent, the mere ideal limit of our minds. We may glimpse it, but we
never  grasp  it; what  we  grasp is  always  some  substitute  for  it  which  previous
human thinking has  peptonized and cooked for  our  consumption.  (James,  1975:
119-20)
24 While in most cognitive situations the sensory flux is peptonized by previous human
thinking, in certain marginal situations of consciousness, for example, when one is in a
semi-coma from sleep,  drugs,  or illness,  or perhaps when one has certain “mystical”
experiences, one can glimpse the sensory flux itself. For James, especially in his late work,
this is a glimpse into “the deeper features of reality” (James, 1979a: 54), the fact that
reality is continuous rather than discrete, plural rather than one. The question is whether
this is a glimpse of the Given?
25 One might think so because it seems that in having this glimpse we are seemingly getting
to  the  sensory flux itself  without  any conceptual  or  interpretive  mediation –  and so
completely prying apart our interpretations from the matters they are interpretations of.
14 But to know whether something is a form of the Given one must know its function; does
it play a foundational role in our system of knowledge, or does it immediately impress
upon one’s mind the categorical nature of reality itself? The sensory flux by itself does
not play any epistemic role for James, it bears no cognitive inferences, and provides no
warrant, so it is not a version of the epistemic Given. But does this glimpse give us access
to the categorical nature of reality, to the really real? In one way yes, in another no. As we
mentioned above, in his late work James repeatedly says that pre-conceptual experience
is more revealing of the true nature of reality than conceptual experience. But is the
categorical structure of what is revealed in marginal states of consciousness “imposed on
the mind as a seal imposes an image on melted wax” (in Sellars’ phrase)? And does this
imposed categorical structure then inform our grasp of the world? What is important to
realize is that for James the sensory flux is a much-at-onceness that contains a plenitude 
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or overabundance of qualities and relations. James’ pluralism applies to both the sensory
realm and to the conceptual realm. For James the way things categorically are cannot be
Given to a subject by their glimpse of the sensory flux because there is no single way things
are in the flux. Our glimpse of the sensory flux is a glimpse of the plurality of things, not
of reality’s single intrinsic nature, and so there is no single categorical structure to be
passed along to inform our grasp of the world. In this way, even at his most mystical,
James avoids what is pernicious in the Myth of the Given.15
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NOTES
1. There are many versions of the Myth of the Given, the most famous being epistemic. This is
the myth that there can be non-conceptual episodes of immediate awareness that have epistemic
authority  simply  through  being  Given.  The  myth  we  are  interested  in  here  is  more  basic,
involving the categorical  nature of what is  Given rather than its  epistemic status.  In Sellars’
words,  this  is  the myth that  “the categorical  structure of  the world –  if  it  has a  categorical
Does James have a Place for Objectivity?
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, V-2 | 2013
8
structure – imposes itself on the mind as a seal imposes an image on melted wax” (Sellars, 1981:
11, emphasis in original omitted). 
2. See Klein forthcoming. 
3. Unfortunately, I cannot justify this claim here, although one will be able to see, after reading
my account of James’ theory of mind, how closely Lewis adheres to it. It is true that Lewis learned
a lot from Peirce, often via Royce. But as Lewis himself said, the “experience” of reading Peirce
“served to  revive  earlier  trains  of  thought,  particularly  such as  found their  initiation under
James’ tutelage” (Lewis, 1968: 17). And it is true, as Misak points out, that Lewis was critical of
James, especially on the issue of truth (see Lewis, 1968 : 11). But this does not rule out the fact
that Lewis’ basic account of how mind imposes order on the chaos of the Given is Jamesian in
nature. See Pancheri (1971) and the chapter on Lewis in Flowers & Murphy (1977).
4. See Lecture 1 of Putnam (1987).
5. James actually identifies many more levels of selection, some pre-personal and some personal,
but these three are sufficient for our purposes.
6. In saying that “experience is  what I  agree to attend to” James overstates his  case.  James’
overall view is much less voluntarist than it seems from this passage insofar as, as we mentioned
above, he posits multiple levels of selection, most of which do not involve conscious “agreement”
or “free choice.”
7. One would need to make things more complex here by accounting for the fact that some
sensations seem, due to the way their intrinsic properties interact with our sense organs, more
forced on us than others. 
8. The relation of sensation and perception is a tricky issue in James. On the one hand, James
insists  that  sensations  are  not  atomic  items  that  can  be  compounded  into  more  complex
perceptual states, but are themselves cognitive states in which simple features of the objective
world  come  into  view.  On  the  other  hand,  he  accepts  that  perception  involves  a  form  of
“apperception” – an interpretation of sensation by “ideas already in the mind” (James, 1981: 751)
– and that “Perception always involves Sensation as a portion of itself” (James, 1981: 651). What
we need, I think, to make sense of his view here is a distinction between a “phenomenology of
perception” and a “transcendental analysis of perception.” From the phenomenological point of
view,  sensations  are  not  states  that  compound  into  more  complex  states,  but  are  singular
cognitive states. So when we go from having a conscious experience of volume and quality, for
example when we are just waking up, to a more complex conscious experience, perceiving the
room that we are waking up in,  we don’t  go from atomic sensory impressions to perceptual
experiences of the room made up of those atomic impressions; rather, we go from having a single
conscious state that has a simple content or object to having a completely new conscious state
with a much more complex content or object.  But from the point  of  view of  transcendental
analysis, we perceive a room as having sensory qualities because there is, within the perceptual
act, an apperception of sensations. The key point is that sensations, even from this point of view,
should not be understood as sensory atoms but as states that disclose features of the objective
world. What apperception adds to sensation is not openness to the world, but relation to a self-
identical object. The notion that a portion of the stream of experience can be about the same
thing  at  different  times  is  not  internal  to  sensations  themselves,  but  is  introduced  into  the
sensory stream through apperception and conceptualization (see: 434). 
9. One  wonders  whether  Sellars’  famous  genius  Jones  was  inspired  by  James’  pre-historic
geniuses. 
10. The conceptions that comprise these schemes are pragmatically a priori. Although they are
instituted because they help make sense of the sensory flux, once instituted “[n]o experience can
upset them. On the contrary, they apperceive every experience and assign it to its place” (James,
1975a: 42). Although these schemes can be revised or abandoned when they no longer “work,”
once instituted they are constitutive of the meaning of the items in the domain that they make
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possible. One can see how those interested in what Michael Friedman calls the ‘relative a priori’
stand, whether they know it or not, in James’ shadow. 
11. Here we find a deep disagreement between James and Peirce. While James often endorses the
Peirceian idea that an idea is true if it holds up in the hypothetical long run, he does not, at least
as I  read him, accept the idea that in the long run we will  necessarily converge on a single
vocabulary  that  carves  reality  at  its  single  true  joints.  He  thinks  that  it  is  an  open  question
whether we will converge on such a vocabulary, or whether, even at the ideal limit of inquiry,
conceptual pluralism will be order of the day. However – and this is my point – in either case
James thinks that we can still have a robust account of objectivity, an account of how the mind is
answerable to the world. The question of whether there is constraint is distinct from whether there is
necessary convergence.
12. This form of argument applies to all the other enumerated “realities” or “worlds.” While a
particle accelerator “creates” more reality in the sense that its use “builds out” reality, the facts
found or discovered by these activities pre-exist the use of the accelerator. 
13. Although on this account we don’t experience the sensory flux directly, our account of it is
still  definable “in  terms drawn from experience”  (James,  1975a:  6)  insofar  as  we experience
resistance and the sensory nature of what is experienced. Hence, it stays within the bounds of
James’ Radical Empiricism.
14. In his excellent paper “Sources of Pluralism in William James” Jim O’Shea argues that James’
view here is not only a version of the Myth of the Given but a “veritable celebration of the myth”
(2000: 39). 
15. Thanks to Alex Klein for incisive comments on this paper. 
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